Turner explains why public policy needs to manage the growth and allocation of credit creation, and why debt needs to be taxed as a form of economic pollution. Banks need far more capital, real estate lending must be restricted, and we need to tackle inequality and mitigate the relentless rise of real estate prices.
Turner also debunks the big myth about fiat money-the erroneous notion that printing money will lead to harmful inflation. To escape the mess created by past policy errors, we sometimes need to monetize government debt and finance fiscal deficits with central-bank money. Between Debt and the Devil shows why we need to reject the assumptions that private credit is essential to growth and fiat money is inevitably dangerous.
Each has its advantages, and each creates risks that public policy must consciously balance. The following ISBNs are associated with this title:.
Adair Turner became chairman of Britain's Financial Services Authority just as the global financial crisis struck in , and he played a leading role in redesigning global financial regulation. Between Debt and the Devil challenges the belief that we need credit growth to fuel. Between Debt and the Devil: Money, Credit, and Fixing Global Finance [Adair Turner] on snakwalldeha.ga *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Adair Turner.
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Turner's main point, as I understand it, is that it is insufficient to focus merely on the unemployment rate, economic growth and inflation in order to monitor economic health. Average Customer Review:. You just clipped your first slide! In addition to forcing banks to hold more capital and thereby crimp their lending, he says, governments should regulate mortgage lending by imposing maximum loan-to-value ratios e. Sporting Goods. This item will ship to Germany , but the seller has not specified shipping options.
But on the other hand he argues that rising inequality, particularly in the US, led many to seek to protect their living standards through unsustainable secured borrowing against houses. Whatever he really thinks about the relationship between rapid credit growth and economic performance before , he lays blame for the anaemic recovery across Europe and the US squarely at the door of the debt overhang that followed the crash.
Some of his prescriptions for prevention next time are familiar: much higher capital requirements and the reintroduction of reserve asset ratios for banks; tighter regulation of shadow banking; maximum loan-to-income and loan-to-value ratios for homebuyers.
His suggestion of international coordination to limit current-account imbalances is surely right, but he remains vague on the path to that destination. Balanced throughout, Turner recognises that this is not without risks.
Would governments, taking this step in a crisis, acquire a taste for monetary finance of public deficits in normal times, leading to inflationary and wasteful public spending? The answer surely depends on whether we have the right institutions in place to manage it appropriately.
And arguably we already do. The alternative to helicopter money is to continue trying to stimulate private credit creation using the tools that major central banks have been using for the past seven years. Unconventional monetary policies like quantitative easing were themselves made politically viable by the trend towards independent central banking in the s and s.
Central bank independence took the control over private credit creation out of the hands of finance ministers, precisely to stop them abusing it for electoral advantage. Money finance, it can be argued, is formally equivalent to quantitative easing combined with a higher inflation target. Public perceptions of and responses to these alternatives are likely to be very different, as is their political viability.
The financial system is undoubtedly less vulnerable than it was, and our understanding of its role and the risks it presents is far more nuanced than it was in Find on Amazon. Next The Silo Effect 01 February